Intercommunal Situation

The following article first appeared in the Armed Forces Journal, and Friends of Cyprus is grateful to the Editor and Publishers of the AFJ for their permission to reproduce it in this edition of the 'Report'. The article is written by Justin Galen, a pen-name of a former senior Defense Department civilian official in the USA. The AFJ is the most authoritative military journal in the US. It is read by most career military officers, particularly the senior officers. The article is addressed to an audience, the Pentagon, where the majority have been supporting Turkey on security considerations, because of the country's geographical, military and intelligence importance.

The article is accurate and objective, and is a stark contrast to some of the explanations of the Turkish situation emanating from some US officials.

Turkey's Unaffordable Force Structure:
Force	Problems
1 Armored Division 2 Mech Divisions 14 Infantry Divisions 5 Infantry Brigades 1 Paratroop Brigade 1 Commando Brigade	More than half of total divisions lack officer and NCO cadres, active manning, trained reservists, and equipment to be combat effective. Approximately 50% of total artillery worn or obsolete. 3,500 M-47 and" M-48 tanks worn, many not properly modernized or maintained. At most only 60% of force structure requirement. 1,600 APCs represent less than 1/3 offeree structre needed. Most anti-tank weapons ineffective againt Soviet tanks. Modern anti-tank weapons less than 15% of requirement. More than half of conscripts complete service insufficiently trained and educated for modern war.
13 Submarines 12 Destroyers 2 Frigates 11 Missile Patrol Boats 8 Large Patrol Boats 46 Other Patrol Craft 22 Mine Vessels 72 Landing Craft 14 ASW Aircraft	Major overall shortages in officers, NCOs, technicians and war reserves. Poor FTX and CPX training for at least two-thirds of all units. Major shortfalls of trained NCOs and technicians (30% or more in some critical categories). Ten of 30 submarines and at least seven of 12 destroyers are too old to be combat effective. Only 19 of 65 patrol craft combat effective. Mining capability obsolete. Overall ASW capability minimal against Soviet submarines. Major maintenance, spare parts, and war reserve shortfalls.
73 F-4E/RF-4E Attack 60 F-5A/B Attack 50 F-100C/D/F Attack 30 F/TF-104G Attack 34 RF-5A/B Recce 20 F-5 A/B Fighter 36 F/TF-104S Fighter	Critical overall shortages of spare parts. Significant problems in pilot and AC & W training. F-100 and F-104 obsolete and worn. F-5 A/B ineffective in air defense role. Limited, largely fair weather recce capability. Critical problems in avionics maintenance. Insufficient engine overhauls and maintenance. Significant shortages and quality problems in key technicians. Lack of modern ASMs, AAMs and overall munitions stocks.

The strategic importance of Turkey is obvious. It shares a 370 mile border with the USSR, it controls the access of the Soviet Black Sea fleet to the Mediterranean, it jointly defends Thrace and the Aegean with Greece, and it is the bulwark of NATO defense capability in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is NATO's only Moslem member, and provides a critical link between the West and the Moslem world. Its large army and air force, and strategic position, act as a major barrier to Soviet expansion into the Middle and Near East. It is the site of 26 US and NATO military bases, including intelligence sites critical to our understanding of Soviet strategic and theater nuclear capabilities, and is a major potential staging point for US operations in defense of the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.

At the same time, Turkey is in the process of economic and military collapse. It is on the edge of civil war: its political system could disintegrate and drive Turkey into pro-Soviet neutrality or even alignment with the Soviet bloc.

It is a nation where the Soviet Union and the West are engaged in a major battle for influence—and the Soviet Union is spending more there in an attempt to achieve control and influence over a free nation than anywhere else in the world.

* Turkey's total foreign debt has risen from $2.8-billion in 1973 to $11.4-billion in 1977, $15.0-billion in 1979, and a projected $17.5-billion in 1980. The cost of servicing this debt has risen to the point where even Turkey's senior officials cannot agree; it will reach between $1 and 3.5-billion next year. The real growth of its Gross National Product has dropped from eight percent in 1975 to 1.7% in 1979.

• Its annual rate of inflation has risen from 10% in 1975 to 85% in 1979, and has now exceeded 50% annually for nearly three years. The Turkish Lire has devalued from 14 to the dollar to 70, and the annual growth of its money supply exceeded 40% from 1977 until the International Monetary Fund forced a halt in 1979.

• Its balance of payments deficit has risen from $86.1-million in 1970 to $700-million in 1974 and a peak of $3.5-billion in 1978. Using slightly different current account figures, Turkey has shifted from a favourable trade balance of $0.5-billion in 1974 to a peak deficit of $2.8-billion when its credit ran out in 1979. And, although Turkey has received over $11-billion of refinancing and credits since 1978, it is now in even deeper financial trouble than before.

• Inflation has interacted with two devaluations and reductions of state subsidies to raise the real or constant dollar price of housing, food, light and heating by about 30-140% during the last three years, and basic commodities have risen by 50-300% in current prices over the last year.

• Unemployment is so high it is virtually impossible to measure. It is usually reported at 25%, but this figure is a gross underestimate. It ignores Turkey's population boom and the vast number of youths and women who either are now not seeking jobs or who have ceased to look for them. It also ignores disguised unemployment—where two or more workers do the work of one.

• Even the most favourable estimates of Turkish industrial activity indicate that Turkish industry is operating at only 30-35% of capacity, and much of the capacity that is operating is inefficient and corrupt state-owned plants.

• Turkey's devaluations, and the need to put stringent controls on imports to get further foreign loans, have created a situation where it is difficult to buy tea and coffee; where medicine is in such short supply that minor surgery is sometimes performed without pain killers; where shortages in domestic and imported edible fats threaten the Turkish diet; and where basic commodities like light bulbs are often unobtainable.

• Turkey would probably have to import 50% of its oil in any case, but chronic mismanagement of state hydroelectric projects and the state coal industry, combined with poor domestic oilfield management, have raised this important level to 80%. Turkey must import between $3.5 and $4-billion worth of oil during 1980. Even if Turkish oil imports are reduced sharply below the current one million tons per month, Turkey will be unable to pay the resulting bill.

• Turkey's tight import controls have proved to be an administrative nightmare. Critical imports for investment purposes, and major exports, are sometimes tied up for months or indefinitely—adding to Turkey's unemployment and balance of payments problems, while smuggling and the black market, on the other hand, have become a $2-3.5-billion national industry.

• The recession that began in Europe in 1974 steadily cut the number of Turkish workers in Northern Europe. These workers at one point reached 600-750,000 and contributed $1.4-billion of Turkey's foreign currency earnings in 1974. They also were a critical relief value for population growth, and for Turkey's failure to diversify its economic development and balance it regionally. Yet, 15-25% of these workers are now unemployed. The remainder—who once sent 75% of their incomes home—are either keeping their money outside the country or selling it in Turkey at inflated prices

"Liquidating assets and getting money out of the country has become another major national industry."

• This has led to corruption permeating every conceivable-level. The combination of political terrorism, inflation, stringent import controls, and declining real salaries has put a price on everything from the smallest permit to the grossest violation of Turkish law. Where people are not for sale, they exchange favors, and these favors can cover virtually anything. Not only civil officials and politicians are involved, but the Army and security forces. It is .possible to get almost anything into the country illegally. Liquidating assets and getting money out of the country has become another major national industry. Virtually every middle or upper class Turk is converting assets and has some kind of holding outside of Turkey.

No class in Turkish society, not even the corrupt and the profiteer, is exempt from the consequences of this economic disaster. It touches peasants as well as bankers. It also makes normal investment virtually a foolhardy risk and paralyzes ordinary economic activity. It divides the nation against itself. Further, it divides a Turkish Army which has slipped from a position of honor and status in Turkish society to a group so badly underpaid now that its real income has dropped by more than 50% in the last five years. The problem for civil servants and state employees is often worse, and far too often this forces the officer or office holder into corruption or support of radical political movements.

Turkey has always suffered from low level political violence and minority problems. Since 1977, however, the level of political violence has built to nightmare proportions:

• Even quasi-official Turkish figures indicate that political murders and deaths from political conflicts and terrorism rose from an average of less than 50 per year in the early 1970s, and only 34 in 1975, to 250 in 1977, and over 1,000 a year—three lives per day—since 1977. Other, unofficial sources indicate that the death rate was well over 2,500 in 1979 in only the Eastern part of Turkey, that over 10,000 were injured enough in left-right clashes in 1979 to require hospital or major medical treatment.

• This violence led to the imposition of martial law in 13 of Turkey's 67 provinces in 1978, and later had to be expanded to 20 provinces, and led to major redeployments of the Army into Turkey's cities and Eastern Turkey where more than 25% of the population is Kurdish or Shi'ite.

• This process of martial law has since involved the Army more and more in the political conflicts within Turkish society, an involvement reinforced by the collapse of Turkey's national police force. This force numbers about 40,000, and out of this total 17,000 are now aligned with leftist organisations, and about 5,000 with the right. The end result is that the police have become the agent of political violence—and the source of terrorist and extremist weapons—while the Army has found itself involved in the spreading political conflicts.

• As late as 1976, the Marxist radical parties in Turkey had little real following. Today, however, there are at least nine to 24 armed radical leftist factions and two-to-six armed right wing groups. These factions now have private armies totalling at least 5,000, armed with machine guns, grenades, and rocket launchers. Even though the Turkish government was able to hunt down two of the leaders of the left wing factions last June—the Action Unit and Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit—there is no doubt that the extremists on both sides are now much stronger. Left-wing Turkish paramilitary units are receiving training in PLO extremist camps in Iraq and possibly Yemen. They are tied to extremist groups in Germany, Italy, and Japan. Turkish effort to halt paramilitary training of right-wing forces in the youth camps of the National Action Party (NAP) have been unsuccessful, as have efforts to halt training by the Association for Fighting the Communists. In fact, the NAP has doubled its share in the vote to 3.5% in 1979, and probably would get over 5% today, and 11 extremist religious groups now have armed factions.

• Similar problems are developing with Kurdish and Shi'ite paramilitary groups. At least 10 armed Kurdish groups now exist, and the problems with Turkey's seven-to-nine million Kurds have become so serious that in early 1979, the Turkish Chief of Staff, General Kenan Evren went to Iraq to work on a co-ordinated plan for control of the Kurdish minority in both countries. This was a major factor in weakening former Prime Minister Ecevit's party, because several prominent Kurds resigned while members of Ecevit's cabinet felt he was too weak in dealing with minorities.

• Turkish forces are now virtually at war with Shi'ite "messengers" sent by the Ayatollah Khomeini from Iran. About 25% of Turkey's population is Alevi or Shi'ite, and it seems probable that only the major redeployment of Turkish troops in late 1978 has stabilized the eastern border areas, and there is no question that Turkey cannot count on the loyalty of its Kurdish and Alevi minority—whose per capita income averages 1/8th that of urban Turks—or of members of the Army and gendarmerie from these minorities.

* Moderate and democratic political parties still dominate Turkish political life. Prime Minister Demirel's Justice Party got 46% of the vote in 1979, and ex-Prime Minister Ecevit's Republican People's Party was able to get 29% These parties also were able to agree on strong new law and order legislation this February. Both, however, have quietly built up their own action arms or goon squads and are now actively trying to built up factions in the police and Army. Turkey's other key party, the right wing Islamic National Salvation Party, (NSP) has gone further. Although it has 10% of the vote and has been a coalition partner in recent governments, the NSP has established action arms with close ties to PLO military advisors.

• The conflicts have led to an unrelenting series of assassinations, bombings and heatings by right and left wing extremists, and by the goon squads of Turkey's "moderate" political parties. Unlike Italy, the Turkish moderate parties have countered violence, and they are not above turning on each other as well as the extremists. The brutal murder of Abdi Ipecki, the respected moderate editor of the newspaper Milliyet. in February, 1979, is typical of such violence. So was the assassination of several Americans, and some 50 incidents of violence against American last year.

• This inevitably has led to counter-abuse and over-reaction by the government forces that are supposed to deal with the situation. Turkish officials announced last year that they had imprisoned 789 terrorists and were seeking 225, but actual political prisoners now probably number well over 4,500, including ethnic groups. Some 2,000 further arrests were made in December and January alone.

There is nothing totally new about these trends. Turkey has long been relatively violent, its political parties have always been unstable, and it has been under martial law for 14 of its 55 year history. At the same time, however, nothing approaching the current situation has existed since the days before Ataturk came to power, and Turkish society as a whole has never been so divided, so important in credible options, or so close to civil war.

These economic and political symptoms are not, however, the result of a disease that can be treated simply through more loans, devaluations, or austerity measures. They are the result of deep underlying problems in Turkish society and of the combined actions of Turkey's two major political parties and its Army.

First, Turkey has done nothing to restrict a 2'/2-3% rate of population growth, which a primarily agricultural society cannot possibly cope with. Turkey was a nation of only 19 million people in 1950. It is now a nation of 44-46 million, and it will double again by the year 2,000. Its overlay of Western institutions cannot possibly cope with this rate of growth, most of which comes from agricultural laborers, ethnic minorities, or unskilled urban poor. Worse, it has created a situation where 40% of Turkey's population is under 15, and where the school system and job market cannot possibly cope with the load of young entrants.

Second, Turkish industry is dominated by large state firms which make up about 50% of Turkish industrial capacity. These industries were originally set up by Ataturk in an effort to move Turkey into modem statehood, and they accordingly became sacred cows with the Army, which regards itself as the guardian of Ataturk's legacy. Unfortunately, they are also an economic disaster. Labor productivity in these industries is one-half to one-third its normal rate, and an honest and competent executive in a state firm is only a theoretical possibility. Turkey's current Prime Minister, Suleyman

Demirel, openly admitted this last winter. He announced that Turkish Airlines employed more than 8,000 people for a 14 aircraft airline:

that Turkey's coal industry had shifted from 30,000 workers who produced 5 million tons in 1970 to 70,000 workers who produce only 4 million tons today; and that roughly half of Turkey's federal budget had to go to cover deficits which these firms generated in 1978-79. Demirel then announced he was cutting the annual subsidy for these firms from over $5-billion a year to less than $950-million, while raising prices by up to 93% to bring them to market level.

Unfortunately, this reaction to pressure from the IMF came only after decades of waste, and the cut in subsidies did not eliminate the massive paperwork, licensing and import barriers Turkey has long erected to block private sector investment and competition with any state owned activity. Demirel is also still sharply limited in what he can do by the Turkish Army—which is seeking a massive expansion in the state owned defense industries, among the least efficient of all.

Third, although Turkey can scarcely be blamed for the shock which a quadrupling oil price gave its economy in 1974, it also did virtually nothing to respond by using its natural resources, if anything, Turkey has let its plans in these areas slide as badly as any area of its economy, although it is conducting joint exploration activity with the USSR and has ambitious paper plans to exploit its coal resources.

Fourth, Turkey originally responded to the oil crisis by almost blithe effort to solve its problems through foreign borrowing. The current Prime Minister, the ex-Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, and the Turkish Army share responsibility for this disaster. Both of Turkey's political leaders dealt with their problems after 1973 by uncontrolled borrowing during their relatively brief periods of power, and took even the most elementary austerity measures only after they were forced to do so by the IMF and outside creditors.

Turkey also wasted its foreign exchange holdings with abandon, it had $2.1-billion in foreign exchange in 1973 and $1.0-billion in 1975, even after the peak of the oil price crisis. Yet by the end of 1977, it had less than $700-million, and it may have less than $400-million by the end of this year.

Fifth, Turkey sustained its GNP growth at four-to-eight per cent during 1974-1976 only by investing in inherently uncompetitive industrial capacity which is now unlikely to be fully used, and which is so inefficient that Turkey's new austere economy cannot afford to permit it to operate. In short, at least a third of Turkey's economic growth over the last decade is now a giant albatross which must be fed constantly to meet foreign debts, but which can never serve a productive purpose.

Sixth, Turkey mismanaged the opportunities its association with the European Economic Community should have given it during the 1970s. It misused its credits, did nothing to make Turkey an attractive opportunity for sound investment, failed to compete when it was given reasonable opportunities or preference, and asked for handouts when it should have offered partnership. It is true that the EEC might have done more to permit labor mobility, accept Turkish agricultural imports, and encourage Turkish industrial imports. It was (he Turkish government, however, that created a climate where it can now only expect EEC support for political reasons. And Turkey's problems with the EEC may soon grow much worse, since Greece is now a full member.

In short, the underlying causes of Turkey's economic and political collapse are not ones that can be dealt with by a continuing series of billion dollar IMF loans or credits, or by US aid at the $300-million a year level. The situation has gone too far. The cure for Turkey is now probably priced in terms of tens of billions, not millions, and in terms of grants, not loans.

"The Turkish Army is not a cure to Turkish democracy, but rather a major cause of the disease."

The Turkish Army is not a cure to Turkish democracy, but rather a major cause of the disease. If the Army were to take over in Turkey, it would almost certainly mean more efforts to shore up state industries, greater use of Turkey's dying credit to import military equipment, and still greater efforts to support Turkey's inflated and Unaffordable force structure.

Historically, the Army has been one of the bulwarks of Turkish society. It has long enjoyed great prestige in Turkey, and it has always been the alternative to the squabbles and corruption of Turkish politics. It is not surprising that one of the standard Turkish jokes about the Army is that the highest rank is President. All of Turkey's Presidents but one have been military, and the only civilian president, Celel Bayar, barly escaped execution for charges the Army brought against him.

It is also true that the Army can still play a major stabilizing role—as long as it stays out of power. This was demonstrated this January, when the Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren, the Service Chiefs, and chief of the Gendarmerie sent an open letter to President Fahri Koroturk threatening to exercise their constitutional prerogative to take over the Government if Turkey's political leaders could not keep order. This letter had sufficient impact to both the Prime Minister to take strong law and order measures, and to persuade ex-Prime Minister Ecevit to support him.

But the Army is now ill-equipped to make good on this threat Its rule during 1960-1961 demonstrated that it could do no better a job of ruling than Turkey's politicians, and Turkey's Army has changed immensely since then. It is now composed of an officer corps that has suffered economic shock after economic shock and which has quietly become more and more politicized. The Army has not been able to separate itself from the general radicalization of educated youth, or to control all of the many class and ethnic tensions in its conscript intake. Worse, since the cut-off of US aid, it-has lost much of its image of efficiency and effectiveness.

The Turkish Army would face major problems even without Turkey's current economic crisis and the cut-offs in US aid that resulted from the Cyprus crisis. Since World War II, Turkey has tried to maintain a force structure it could not man or equip.

This is not to say that Turkey does not face real threats. The Soviet Union and Bulgaria can bring massive land and air power against Turkey with limited warning, and they regularly exercise the invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Bosphorous. Further, while Greece is Turkey's titular NATO ally, it not only represents a potential enemy and a constant risk of war, but the risk of a cut-off of all Western arms supply and aid.

Turkey can count on only token reinforcement from the Central Region, and almost all earmarked European land and air reinforcements are virtually incapable of meeting first line Soviet armor and aircraft. Even the US can provide only limited air reinforcement; US Marines and other units that might be sent to the Southern Flank are neither ready nor equipped to deal with the Soviet armor forces most likely to attack Turkey.

Yet, as two generations of US and NATO military advisors have pointed out, this threat does not justify trying to feed a force structure Turkey cannot afford. The result has been to make Turkey weaker, not stronger:

Turkey has had to dilute its limited numbers of skilled officers and NCOs into far too large a force structure. Even Turkey's best units are often critically short of skilled leadership and the most basic technical skills. Repairable equipment is often allowed to rot or used to destruction. Many of Turkey's logistic and support forces are incapable of performing even the most basic military functions. While Turkey's infantry and small unit training is outstanding, its overall training is poor to non-existent.

Although Turkey has maintained one of the highest ratios of active military to total population in the world, it has never been able to properly man its force structure. The problem is not simply a lack of educated personnel in a developing society; the problem is that Turkey does not have enough conscripts to provide any personnel at all. Further, Turkish reserves have token value at best because the bulk of discharged conscripts must receive basic education while on active duty, and get negligible training for their post-discharge mobilization assignments.

Turkey has never been able to bring its military equipment into balance with its resources. Turkey lacks the equipment numbers that would begin to support out its force structure, and much of Turkey's military equipment is worn to the point where its combat performance is uncertain and is so diverse in type that it presents major logistic and spare parts burdens. Even first line Turkish equipment was often partially inoperable even before the current economic crisis because buying new equipment meant insufficient money to maintain or repair it.

"Turkey is concentrating its limited resources to get well in a year that will never arrive."

' This also constantly distorts all aspects of Turkish defense planning as the Army tries to compensate for these problems. Rather than seeking to use its existing resources effectively, Turkey has always planned to "fix" its problems at some point in the future with higher defense budgets and aid levels than it could ever hope to achieve. Turkey is concentrating its limited military resources to get well in a year that will never arrive.

The end result is that the Turkish soldiers who so impress foreign observers are part of an Army with only limited real military capability. The toughness of the individual Turkish soldier disguises the fact that the Turkish Army as a whole has grown more obsolete with each passing year, and lacks the leadership, manpower, and resources to fight as an overall force.

Although Turkey has recently made some downward adjustments in its force structure and managed some overall improvement in capability each year before the cut-off of US aid, these improvements have not kept up with the improvements in corresponding Soviet units.

Many of the problems inherent in any American effort to aid this inflated force structure have been obscured by the long debate over the 1974 arms embargo, and the limits placed on US arms sales and aid between 1975 and 1979.

The US made it clear to Turkey long before the Cyprus embargo that Turkey would have to transition from military assistance aid to foreign military sales (FMS) loans. Accordingly, while Turkey received something on the order of $3-billion worth of MAP equipment, excess articles, and training services during 1955-1969m there was never any prospect of receiving the air it needed to maintain its force structure in the 1970s—with or without the crisis in Cyprus.

This is not saying that the 1974 Arms Embargo did not have a critical impact. It initially blocked sales as well as grants, restricted the availability of key equipment and made Turkey ineligible for the preferential credits it desperately needed. Turkey was forced to go from about $60-90-million in MAP aid in 1971-1975 to zero in 1976. This led to an immediate increase in FMS purchases, from less than $5-million before 1971 to $120-200-million-plus in 1976-1980. The impact of the US cuts, and Turkey's inability to find substitutes from Europe, is dramatized by the fact that even before Turkey's ecnomic crisis, Turkish arms imports during 1967-1973 to about 6% of total imports during 1974-1976, and to as low as 2% of imports in 1977.

It seems unlikely, therefore, that Turkey would have been able to afford more than half of the equipment it needed to support its inflated force structure—even if Turkey had only had to cope with the cut-off of US MAP aid. The Cyprus embargo, however, reduced total Turkish arms purchases to less than 25-33% of Turkey's minimal requirements during 1975-1979, and had the secondary effect of forcing the Turks to let much of their existing equipment deteriorate beyond reconditioning because of lack of spares.

The result is a force structure the US can do little to fix. Recent US military assistance studies have shown that it would cost about $1.5-billion in one time purchases to bring Turkey's force structure to the point where the Turkish order of battle would be capable of direct combat with counterpart Soviet forces, and about $10-billion simply to modernize existing Turkish equipment without providing the additional equipment numbers needed to make Turkish units combat effective. Compromise US and Turkish estimates of the aid required—cut in order to reflect some hope of actual funding—indicate that Turkey needs $5-billion in military grants and credits over the next five years simply to keep its current force structure from deteriorating further. Even former Prime Minister Ecevit's "New Defense Concept," which would have involved some useful reductions in Turkey's force structure, required $2'/2-3¹3 1/2-billion in new major equipment, and continued US aid levels in excess of $500-million a year.

Yet the US gave Turkey only about $225-million in aid in FY79, of which $175-million was in military credits. Total US aid to Turkey in FY80 will probably be about $450-million, and the military portion will be only about $252-million. While West Germany has provided about $70-million in military aid in 1979 and 1980, and other nations have also provided military aid, much of this remaining aid has been in the form of credits. Such additional aid may be available in the future, and most past aid must eventually be repaid. Given the current state of the US economy, it seems unlikely that future US aid to Turkey will never be more than $300-million per year in military credits and grants combined, and such credits will add even more debt burden to Turkey's economy.

This means there is little chance that Turkey can make its present force structure effective, and equally little chance that Turkey will ever get the levels of aid it is seeking. Its 470,000 man force structure is a military myth that will grow weaker each year unless Turkey cuts its manning and units to a level it can afford. It also means that Turkish officers and NCOs will remain chronically underpaid, frustrated, and open targets for political influence. Like the rest of Turkish society, they will be tied to institutions which seem to be a failure, and caught up in a system to which they can give increasingly less allegiance.

The Soviet Union has already undertaken a major effort to capitalize on Turkey's crisis. Although this Soviet effort is still far from successful, it has produced major dividends. Turkey is now tar more likely to move towards a Third World position, or even a limited alignment with the USSR, than before the 1974 US arms embargo.

This effort has long been in the making. The Soviets and Bulgarians have adopted a low profile towards Turkey since the 1960s, and the old memories of tension on the border have largely died. The USSR also made quiet overtures to improve diplomatic relations with Turkey after the first Cyprus crisis in the mid-1960s. These overtures were well timed given the fact that President Johnson had threatened then Prime Minister Inonu with abandonment in the face of a Soviet attack if Turkey invaded Cyprus.

These overtures, and the general shift towards detente, eventually led to a formal improvement of diplomatic relations in 1972, and this was reinforced by Soviet policy during the October war, when Turkey allowed the USSR to overfly Turkey to aid Egypt and Syria. This placed the US in an awkward role—appearing to oppose the Moslem world while the Soviets aided it.

Accordingly, the stage was well set for the USSR when the US Congress passed its arms embargo in December, 1974, and Turkey closed US intelligence bases in the following July. By 1975, Turkey had signed agreements with the USSR which made it in the world's fourth largest recipient of Soviet aid. This led to an "easing of tensions" symbolized by the Turks letting Russians, in July of 1976, sail the aircraft carrier, Kiev, through the Dardanelles as an ASW cruiser, although this is forbidden by the Montreux Convention. In 1976, the USSR began to discuss an aid project of $600-700-million, and Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia also began to offer aid.

Then in 1977, as Turkey's foreign credit began to tighten, the USSR offered Turkey a $1.2-billion loan. It also began to offer significant military assistance. In April, 1978, Soviet Chief of Staff Ogarkov visited his Turkish counterparts—the first senior Soviet military officer to visit Turkey since 1933. The USSR then made a formal offer of arms sales and aid in June, 1978, an offer it now keeps tacitly available at any time.

In July, 1978, the new Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit went to Moscow. Although the resulting "political Document on Friendly Relations with the USSR" did not, as the Soviets desired, come close to being a non-Aggression Pact, it was still far closer than many Western observers would have liked.

To be sure, these efforts have not yet succeeded in driving Turkey away from NATO and the West. They have, however, created a serious Soviet alternative to Western influence. The USSR does not need to control or dominate Turkey at any time in the near future, simply to ease it out of NATO and away from American influence. It makes little difference to the USSR whether Turkey becomes non-aligned, shifts to a Moslem bloc, or moves to the left. It is enough that Turkey take any path as a result of its economic and political crisis, other than maintaining its ties to the US.

The strength of Soviet interest in achieving this goal is demonstrated by the fact that the USSR continued to provide Turkey with increased oil supplies at special prices and credit terms in 1979, even as it was cutting supplies and denying these terms to its Warsaw Pact allies. It is clear that the USSR is now willing to risk billions of dollars to try to buy Turkey away from the West. While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has provided a breathing space, any further worsening of Turkey's economic and military crisis coupled to Western inaction could well push Turkey into ecnomic dependence on the USSR.

"It will take a major act of Western leadership to provide Turkey with any hope of a relatively quick recovery."

There is no cheap cure for either Turkey's socio-economic ills or its military problems. There are answers, but it will take a major act of Western leadership to provide Turkey with any hope of a relatively quick recovery.

The major problem Turkey now faces is that while the austerity measure the IMF has forced upon it may ultimately help, Turkey lacks the money and time it needs for them to work. Turkey needs something of the order of $20-30-billion in long term credits and grants over the next one to two years. This level of aid is essential to give Turkey's private sector enough confidence to start reinvesting and begin economic recovery, to fund the imports Turkey needs for economic growth, and to ease the price and import controls on basic commodities enough so that Turkey's people can move away from the thin edge of social collapse.

The West cannot dribble aid out in $500-million or even $2-billion increments. This simply will mean throwing the money away without providing hope. Turkey needs a massive effort of the type provided in the Marshall Plan. There is already talk of such a massive aid consortium of the US, Europe, and oil nations like Saudi Arabia. If Turkey is to survive, however, such a consortium must be more than talk. Even on the edge of a worldwide recession, the West must be willing to fund a massive single dose of capital. At the same time, Turkey must be willing to use it under strict constraints, stick with the present IMF restraints instead of returning to past economic abuses, and open up its economy to large scale private sector replacement of its inefficient state firms.

The West and Turkey must also recognise that there is no similar cure for the present Turkish military force structure. The Turkish Army is like a patient, one of whose limbs have a massive case of gangrene. The only cure is amputation. If Turkey continues the attempt to cure its military problems with small doses of aid and equipment, it will continue to make steadily more unrealizable demands for Western aid that never comes, place a burden on the Turkish economy, which is not offset by military effectiveness, and create tension and alienation within its military.

A workable Turkish force posture will mean cutting the Turkish Army from 566,000 men, including the Air Force, Navy and Gendarmerie, to about 300,000. It will mean eliminating most of Turkey's low quality infantry divisions, and cutting back part of its Air Force and Navy. It will mean about a 15-20% cut in the number of total combat aircraft, while shifting away from reliance on tanks and armor to much heavier emphasis on anti-tank weapons. It will mean facing up to the fact Turkey can never afford a military structure designed to fight Greece and the Soviet Union at the same time, or cope with the Warsaw Pact threat alone.

Turkey will have to make its own detailed decisions about these force cuts, but it will have to do so with the clear knowledge that future US military aid and credits should be kept at levels no higher than $300-million a year, if that. It should also face the reality that the sine qua non for massive US economic aid may be for the Turkish Army to phase down to a realistic force posture. Turkey must also face the reality that it may have to make concessions regarding Cyprus, or terms for Greece's re-entry to NATO, to get US and European support for all the economic aid it needs.

Even in the military case, however, the US might offer a partial cure for one of Turkey's illnesses. While Turkey's defense industries are now scarcely cost effective, it would not take massive amounts of capital to make them efficient. Further, this is an area where US advisors might be able to play a vital role in providing Turkey with help in a "one shot" effort to create the new management capabilities it needs.

In fact, the US has already laid the ground work for such assistance. The US did agree to provide $30-million in aid to the Turkish arms industry in late 1979. If this aid was expanded to $100-200-million over two or three years, and coupled to the management aid Turkey needs, it might allow Turkey to turn its M.K.E.K- plants into an efficient industry. This would not only allow Turkey's plants to produce ammunition at reasonable cost, but equip them to rebuild and upgrade Turkey's M-48 tanks, APCs and AFVs, and artillery. It would avoid the uncertainties of the lease agreement that was part of the $30-million aid package, and provide enough capital to turn the Arifiye plants into a facility that could fully up-gun and up-engine Turkey's obsolete tanks.

Similar improvements might fund a truly costeffective aircraft engine overhaul capability, and a fighter refitting capability at facilities like the Kirkale plant near Ankara. It could also make effective use of Turkish shipbuilding skills, which now can only be used inefficiently. This could be coupled to plans to expand the Turkish naval base at Golcuk, in order to "home port" US ships there.

Such improvements in Turkey's arms industry would not reduce the need for Turkish force cuts. They would, however, greatly ease Turkey's ability to make a smaller force structure more effective. They would also give Turkey the assurance it would not be vulnerable to another embargo, while involving sufficient time to ease Greek concerns.

The fact that high-priced cures exist to Turkey's illnesses in no way means that the patient will be offered charitable treatment—or willing to take such medicine if it is offered. Turkey has sunk a long way, and must now try to survive in a world ecnomic climate so bad that even Western Germany has had to ask for financial help from Saudi Arabia. The prognosis is at best 50-50, and the most likely outcome seems to be either decline into total collapse and civil war, or—more probably—an Army takeover with the same ultimate outcome.

While there is a good case for massive Western aid to Turkey, it is also hard to avoid the conclusion that Turkey is its own victim. While the West has made mistakes, they are minor compared to those of Turkish politicians and the Turkish Army. As a result, even massive aid may be ineffective and too late because of the distance Turkey has already travelled towards its own self-destruction. Unfortunately, if the US ever has to ask the question of "Who lost Turkey," the answer will be the same as for Iran: it will be the Turks who lost Turkey. And the Turks may succeed in completing their collapse any time in the next two years.