A GUIDE ON CROSS-VOTING
A NECESSARY FEATURE FOR A VIABLE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

1. How would cross-voting operate?

Greek-Cypriots (G-Cs) and Turkish-Cypriots (T-Cs) have always voted separately. Under this proposal all voters would cast votes in both the G-C and the T-C elections. The totals of G-C votes in the T-C election would be scaled down by an arithmetical formula to represent the same percentage of the total as T-C votes in the G-C election.

Such votes cast in the election of the "other" community would then be adjusted so as to achieve the "desired percentage" strength of each community in the elections of the other. This "desired percentage" would of course have to be agreed and included in the constitution.

2. What would be the effects of cross-voting? (a) Even if the "desired percentage" were the proportion of T-C voters in the total electorate, but to a greater degree if it were higher (say 30 or 35 percent) in acknowledgement of the bicommunal nature of the Republic, such a system would make it advisable for politicians of both communities to appeal also to members of the other community for their votes. Until now there has been no advantage in so doing. On the contrary opposition to the "other" community or at the least neglect of its concerns, has been the "lowest common denominator" in each community. Thus the results of such a system would be:

(i) to give a premium to all politicians to develop policies that would appeal to members of the other community. Not all would. Those that did would be rewarded. 

(ii) to ensure the presence in the federal legislature of politicians who would take the wishes of the other community into account, for reasons of self-interest as well as of conviction.

(iii) on the (reasonable) assumption that the members of the federal legislature, sitting separately, would also make up the legislatures of the federated states, to ensure the same for those legislatures. This would represent a significant protection for members of the "other" community settling or investing in either federated state.

3. Would such a proposal be beneficial to the T-C community?

Apart from the benefits to all Cyprus, cross-voting would ensure T-C control of their federated state within a federal Cyprus. A T-C fear is that, after some EU - style transitional period, G-Cs would settle again in their region. How could they - in accordance with democratic principle - be taxed, without having a vote? If they obtained a vote the T-Cs might gradually lose control. If they did not obtain a vote the principle of "no taxation without representation" would be breached.

Under the proposed system all G-Cs would have cast one of their votes for T-C legislators, and in view of their acceptance of the principle of a bizonal federation, the representation of G-Cs resident in the T-C federated state would pass through the general G-C choice of T-C representatives. Thus:

- T-Cs would control the legislature as well as the executive, civil service and police of their federated state in complete political security.

- G-Cs could settle and invest in property freely in the T-C federated state without representing a political threat to T-Cs.

4. Why should the proposal be put forward now?

- Because efforts will be made to secure a settlement before discussions begin with the EU in 1997.

- Because a federal solution has been accepted by both communities under the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, but the T-C community is reluctant to accept freedom of settlement and investment, essential rights in any EU based or indeed in any federal solution, unless it feels its political security will not be threatened.

- Because the alternative - actually or effectively confederal - solution being pushed by most Turkish officials, and also by a few Greeks and Greek-Cypriots, in the interests of two "ethnically clean" areas in Cyprus would be a disaster for Europe since it would mean having as a constituent part of the EU a body politic controlled by a country outside the EU - Turkey - and indeed by the military of that country at that! Mr Karayalcin's statement on possible Turkish annexation and Mrs Ciller's on the Cyprus problem being soluble only with Turkey's entry into the EU, even if withdrawn, demonstrate the political attitudes that would continue in any such settlement, a "settlement" that would be as unstable as the Turkish military's political objectives, and thus for the EU no "solution" at all.

- Because the G-Cs should be encouraged to commit themselves to constitutional provisions which would simultaneously make a federal state work better and give all reasonable security, within such a federal arrangement, to the T-Cs. Such a commitment could help enable the EU to persuade the T-C community, over time, that entry to the EU is also in its own interests.

5. Appendix: What might the electoral system(s) be? For the lower house the obvious system would be a single party list as in Israel and the Netherlands. This would give an incentive to parties to appeal to members of the other community, since each elector would vote for one G-C and one T-C party. For the upper house, to be equally divided between the communities, the electoral system might be the single transferable vote as in Ireland and for the Australian Senate. This would give an equal incentive to prominent political personalities to appeal to members of the other community. This last could be achieved by dividing the Republic on a north-south line in such a way that the two (eastern and western) constituencies would contain the same percentages of G-Cs and T-Cs as the whole Republic.

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